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Abstract. Peek and Rosengren (2005) suggested the mechanism of “unnatural
selection,” where Japanese banks with impaired capital increase credit to low-quality
ﬁrms because of their motivation to pursue balance sheet cosmetics. In this study, we
reexamine this mechanism in terms of the interaction eﬀect in a nonlinear speciﬁcation
of bank lending, using data from 1994 to 1999. We rigorously demonstrate that their
estimation results imply that Japanese banks allocated lending from viable ﬁrms to
unviable ones regardless of the degree of bank capitalization.
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1. Introduction When borrowers become insolvent, a bank may become ﬁnancially
distressed. Such a ﬁnancially distressed bank has incentives to continue to lend to insol-
vent borrowers to conceal its predicament, while hoping that the circumstance of insolvent
borrowers will improve. This type of bank lending that hopes for a revival in the credit
status of borrowers is called forbearance lending, evergreening lending, or zombie lending.
If many banks engage in this type of lending, the resulting misallocation of credit to unvi-
able ﬁrms that could go bankrupt would damage the macroeconomic situation further still
(Hoshi (2006) and Caballero et al. (2008)). Hence, this practice has been considered to be
the source of the prolonged economic stagnation experienced since the 1990s in Japan.
The empirical study by Peek and Rosengren (2005) is the most important and inﬂuential
piece of research on the misallocation of bank credit in Japan.1 They speciﬁed forbearance
lending in a nonlinear function and used loan-level data from 1994 to 1999. They found
that Japanese banks’ attempts to avoid the realization of losses on their balance sheets
(so-called balance sheet cosmetics herein) induces the mechanism of “unnatural selection,”
in which Japanese banks with impaired capital are more likely to provide additional credit
to unviable ﬁrms.
In this study, we reassess this mechanism in terms of the interaction eﬀect in a nonlinear
1 Empirical research on forbearance lending in Japan also includes Sekine et al. (2003) and Watanabe
(2010). Sekine et al. (2003) used ﬁrm-level panel data from 1986 to 1999 and found that highly indebted
ﬁrms belonging to nonmanufacturing industries are more likely to increase their bank borrowings for the
sample period after 1993 despite their low level of proﬁtability. Watanabe (2010) used bank-level panel data
from 1995 to 2000, demonstrating that banks with large capital losses, particularly caused by the regulator’s
request in 1997 for the rigorous assessment of outstanding bank loans, are more likely to reallocate lending
to unhealthy industries with a higher concentration of nonperforming loans. In terms of a theoretical
framework, Bruche and Llobet (2014) provided a precondition for avoiding forbearance lending to low-
quality ﬁrms. They suggested that regulators should induce banks to disclose the deterioration of their
capital condition.
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speciﬁcation of bank lending. Thus, we rigorously demonstrate that Peek and Rosengren’s
(2005) estimation results imply that Japanese banks allocated lending from viable ﬁrms to
unviable ones regardless of the degree of bank capitalization.
The rest of the paper is as follows: Section 2 discusses the potential shortcoming of Peek
and Rosengren’s (2005) nonlinear speciﬁcation of bank lending in terms of the interaction
eﬀect, Section 3 reexamines the implication of their estimation results, and the ﬁnal section
provides our conclusions.
2. Specifying Lending to Low-quality Firms by using a Nonlinear Function
Peek and Rosengren (2005) speciﬁed forbearance lending by using a random eﬀects probit
model with an interaction term consisting of a low-capitalized bank indicator and a ﬁrm
performance variable (i.e., return on assets or working capital ratio). They set random
eﬀects terms for each ﬁrm as ﬁrm unobserved components. This section brieﬂy explains
the potential shortcoming of specifying the misallocation of bank credit in such a random
eﬀects probit model with an interaction term.2
To illustrate the essence of this econometric problem, following Ai and Norton (2003),
we use a general functional form F (·) and write the conditional expected values of y as a
function of the linear index function v = β1x1 + β2x2 + β12(x1 × x2) + X3B3:
E[y|x1, x2, X3] = F (v) = F (β1x1 + β2x2 + β12(x1 × x2) + X3B3). (1)
2 The same problem of the statistical inference of an interaction term in a nonlinear equation has also
been discussed in political science (e.g., Berry et al. (2010)).
2
Function F could be the logit or probit transformation, the logarithmic or exponential
transformation, or any other nonlinear function of the linear index function v. x1 and x2
denote the continuous variables to be used to construct the interaction term x1 × x2 in
the nonlinear function F . X3 denotes a vector variable including other observable control
variables.
In nonlinear equation (1), we can express the marginal eﬀect of xk (k = 1 or 2) on the
conditional expected value of y as follows:3
∂E[y|x1, x2, X3]
∂xk
=
dF
dv
dv
dxk
= (βk + β12xl)
dF
dv
for k = l. (2)
Then, we can write the cross-partial derivative, or the so-called “interaction eﬀect” in the
following equation:
∂2E[y|x1, x2, X3]
∂x1∂x2
=
∂
∂x1
[
dF
dv
(β2 + β12x1)
]
=
∂
∂x2
[
dF
dv
(β1 + β12x2)
]
=
[
dF
dv
β12
]
+
[
d2F
dv2
(β1 + β12x2)(β2 + β12x1)
]
. (3)
Note that even if the coeﬃcient of the interaction term, β12, is zero, the expression above
for the interaction eﬀect, ∂2E[y|x1, x2, X3])/∂x1∂x2, still has a nonzero value. This means
that the statistical signiﬁcance of the interaction eﬀect cannot be tested with that of the
estimated coeﬃcient of β12. Further, the sign of β12 does not necessarily indicate that of
3 To clarify the issue of the nonlinear speciﬁcations of bank lending, we assume that x1 and x2 are
continuous variables. We discuss below the case where one of these two variables is an indicator variable,
which is the case where Peek and Rosengren (2005) speciﬁed the forbearance lending with by using the a
probit speciﬁcation.
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the interaction eﬀect.
In Peek and Rosengren (2005), y corresponds to an indicator variable, LOANi,j,t, which
has a value of one if loans to ﬁrm i by bank j increases from year t− 1 to year t and zero
otherwise. Thus, they performed the probit transformation of the linear index v in function
E[y|x1, x2, X3] = Pr(y = 1|x1, x2, X3) = Φ(v), where Φ(·) is the cumulative distribution
function of the standard normal distribution.
Variable x1 corresponds to a low-capitalized bank indicator REQ2j,t−1, which is a (0,1)
dummy variable that has a value of one if the bank’s reported risk-based capital ratio
is less than two percentage points above the bank’s required capital ratio at year t − 1
and zero otherwise. Variable x2 corresponds to the lagged variable of ﬁrm i’s ﬁnancial
capability, measured by using its proﬁtability measured as return on assets FROAi,t−1 or
the working capital ratio FWORKCAPi,t−1. Vector variable X3 includes other lender-side
and borrower-side observables. In their speciﬁcation of bank lending, if the interaction
eﬀects of REQ2j,t−1×FROAi,t−1 and REQ2j,t−1×FWORKCAPi,t−1 have negative values, it
implies that low-capitalized banks provide more credit to unviable ﬁrms (i.e., those that
have lower proﬁtability and lower ﬁnancial health) than non-low-capitalized banks do.
A potential shortcoming of the approach of Peek and Rosengren (2005) is that their
analysis with the probit estimation of the bank lending equation was based on the estimated
coeﬃcients of the bank ﬁnancial health variable as well as the ﬁrm performance variables
and their interaction terms, but not on the marginal eﬀects and interaction eﬀects, as
expressed in equations (2) and (3). Their estimated coeﬃcients of the bank ﬁnancial health
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indicator, REQ2j,t−1, had signiﬁcantly positive values, while those of the ﬁrm variables,
FROAi,t−1 and FWORKCAPi,t−1, had signiﬁcantly negative ones.
More importantly, they showed that the coeﬃcients of the interaction terms, β12, were
estimated to be signiﬁcantly negative, thereby arguing that low-capitalized banks were
more likely to lend credit to low-quality ﬁrms; in other words, forbearance lending by low-
capitalized banks to low-quality ﬁrms prevailed during the late 1990s in Japan. However,
as discussed above, the negative values of the coeﬃcients of the interaction terms do not
necessarily ensure the existence of forbearance lending in terms of the interaction eﬀects,
∂2E[y|x1, x2, X3]/∂x1∂x2. Rather, negative estimates of the interaction eﬀects are necessary
for the existence of forbearance lending to low-quality ﬁrms by low-capitalized banks, who
have window-dressing motives to avoid the realization of losses on their balance sheets. In
the next section, we thus reexamine this mechanism of unnatural selection by reporting the
estimated interaction eﬀects obtained with the same probit speciﬁcation as that in Peek
and Rosengren (2005).
3. Reexamination of the Mechanism of Unnatural Selection In the random
eﬀects probit speciﬁcation proposed by Peek and Rosengren (2005), the interaction eﬀect
in equation (3) is expressed as follows:
Δ∂E[y|x1, x2, X3, ri]
Δx1∂x2
=
Δ∂ Pr[y = 1|x1, x2, X3, ri]
Δx1∂x2
=
∂Φ(v + ri)
∂x2
∣∣∣∣∣
x1=1
− ∂Φ(v + ri)
∂x2
∣∣∣∣∣
x1=0
= φ(β1 + β2x2 + β12x2 + X3B3 + ri)(β2 + β12)
−φ(β2x2 + X3B3 + ri)β2, (4)
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where φ(·) = Φ′(·) is the probability density function of the standard normal distribution.
x1 is the low-capitalized bank indicator, REQ2j,t−1, and x2 is ﬁrm performance measured
by using the return on assets, FROAi,t−1 or working capital ratio, FWORKCAPi,t−1. ri
indicates ﬁrm i’s random eﬀects.4
Equation (4) clariﬁes the essence of the empirical analysis based on the interaction
terms of the low-capitalized bank indicator and ﬁrm performance variables. The ﬁrst term
in this equation represents the marginal eﬀect of bank j’s loans to ﬁrm i with respect to
ﬁrm i’s proﬁtability (x2 = FROAi,t−1 or FWORKCAPi,t−1) in the case where bank j is low-
capitalized (i.e., x1 = REQ2j,t−1 = 1). The second term indicates the marginal eﬀect in the
case where the bank is not low-capitalized (i.e., x1 = REQ2j,t−1 = 0). This decomposition
of the interaction eﬀect allows us to rigorously analyze the lending behavior of all banks in
Japan regardless of their degree of bank capitalization.5
Let us express the former marginal eﬀect evaluated at a hypothetical value of ﬁrm
performance, x2 = x˙2, as MEi,j,t(REQ2j,t−1 = 1, x2 = x˙2) and the latter marginal eﬀect
as MEi,j,t(REQ2j,t−1 = 0, x2 = x˙2). Then, we obtain a consistent estimator for the av-
erage interaction eﬀect evaluated at a hypothetical value of ﬁrm performance (hereafter,
4 To estimates the interaction eﬀect using the random eﬀects probit speciﬁcation, we must obtain a
marginal prediction with respect to the ﬁrm random eﬀects, Pr(y = 1|x1, x2, X3). We compute the marginal
prediction by integrating a conditional prediction, Pr(y = 1|x1, x2, X3, ri), with respect to the ﬁrm random
eﬀects over their support; more speciﬁcally, Pr(y = 1|x1, x2, X3) =
∫
Φ(v + ri)g(ri|σ2)dri, where g(ri|σ2)
indicates the N(0, σ2) density function of the random eﬀects.
5 Once we introduce the interaction terms, we cannot derive correct inferences about the lending behavior
prevailing in the Japanese banking system without comparing the lending behavior of non-low-capitalized
and low-capitalized banks. Peek and Rosengren (2005) obtained negative estimates for a coeﬃcient pa-
rameter of ﬁrm proﬁtability, thus suggesting that Japanese banks lend more credit to low-quality ﬁrms
through evergreening lending. However, their interpretation of these negative estimates is unsuitable for
their empirical analysis based on the interaction terms.
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AIE(x2 = x˙2)) as the sample mean of the interaction eﬀect (4):
AIE(x2 = x˙2) =
1
n
n∑
i,j,t
⎡
⎣∂Φ(v + ri)
∂x2
∣∣∣∣∣
x1=1,x2=x˙2
⎤
⎦− 1
n
n∑
i,j,t
⎡
⎣∂Φ(v + ri)
∂x2
∣∣∣∣∣
x1=0,x2=x˙2
⎤
⎦
=
1
n
n∑
i,j,t
MEi,j,t(REQ2j,t−1 = 1, x2 = x˙2)
− 1
n
n∑
i,j,t
MEi,j,t(REQ2j,t−1 = 0, x2 = x˙2)
= AME(REQ2j,t−1 = 1, x2 = x˙2)
−AME(REQ2j,t−1 = 0, x2 = x˙2), (5)
where n denotes the number of observations (bank–ﬁrm relationships).6 We calculate the
standard errors of the average marginal eﬀects by using the delta method.
To reexamine the implication of Peek and Rosengren’s (2005) estimation results with the
average interaction eﬀects, we start by replicating the estimation results from their dataset
of AER Final Data.txt, which is available online at the journal website. The analysis of the
average marginal eﬀects presented below is based on the replication of the “Full sample”
results reported in Table 5 of Peek and Rosengren (2005). The sample period runs from
1994 to 1999, during which Japanese banks faced increasing pressure to maintain regulatory
capital requirements under the Basel I framework.
Table 1 reports the estimated coeﬃcients of and descriptive statistics for the bank’s ﬁ-
6 More strictly, the ﬁrst and second terms in equation (5) respectively represent the counterfactual
eﬀects in the hypothetical cases where all banks are low-capitalized and non-low-capitalized ones; hence, the
interaction eﬀect measures the treatment eﬀect of the bank’s low capitalization, expressed in REQ2j,t−1 = 1,
as long as the confounding factors that can aﬀect bank capitalization are fully controlled for in the bank
lending equation by using X3.
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nancial health indicator, x1 =REQ2j,t−1, and ﬁrm performance variables measured by using
the return on assets, x2 = FROAi,t−1, and working capital ratio, x2 = FWORKCAPi,t−1.7
The descriptive statistics for REQ2j,t−1 indicate that about 70 percent of Japanese banks
showed a low degree of capitalization in the late 1990s. The estimation results in this
table clearly show that we can replicate Peek and Rosengren’s (2005) estimation results:
REQ2j,t−1 has a signiﬁcantly positive coeﬃcient, while FROAi,t−1 and FWORKCAPi,t−1
have signiﬁcantly negative ones. The interaction terms, REQ2j,t−1×FROAi,t−1 and REQ2j,t−1
× FWORKCAPi,t−1, appear to have signiﬁcantly negative coeﬃcients.8
Figure 1 reports the estimated interaction eﬀects and marginal eﬀects obtained by using
the ﬁrm performance variables, FROAi,t−1 (upper panels) and FWORKCAPi,t−1 (lower
panels). The left-hand side panels show the estimated interaction eﬀects, AIE(x2 = x˙2),
while the right-hand side panels show the estimated marginal eﬀects for low- and non-
low-capitalized banks, AME(REQ2j,t−1 = 1, x2 = x˙2) and AME(REQ2j,t−1 = 0, x2 = x˙2).
The interaction eﬀect and marginal eﬀect are estimated at each hypothetical value of ﬁrm
performance, x2 = x˙2, whose range corresponds to the sample range from -25 to 25 for
return on assets and from -120 to 80 for the working capital ratio.
The shaded areas of each panel also report the histograms of the two ﬁrm variables to
allow us to analyze the allocation of bank credit in association with the actual performance
7 Peek and Rosengren (2005) deﬁned the ﬁrm’s return on assets as FROAi,t = Operating Proﬁti,t /
Total Asseti,t−1 × 100 and the ﬁrm’s working capital ratio as FWORKCAPi,t =(Liquid Asseti,t - Current
Liabilityi,t) / Total Asseti,t−1 × 100.
8 Our random eﬀects probit regression includes all the other control variables and reproduces the same
estimation results for these as in Peek and Rosengren’s (2005) regression, though Table 1 does not report
the results. For the estimation results of the other control variables, see Table 5 in Peek and Rosengren
(2005).
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of borrowing ﬁrms in the late 1990s. The histograms illustrate that few Japanese ﬁrms
borrowing capital in the late 1990s suﬀered from low proﬁtability and/or low ﬁnancial
capability. Indeed, nine-tenths and three-quarters of the distribution of the return on
assets and working capital ratio show positive values, respectively.
Note that the estimated interaction eﬀects, AIE(x2 = x˙2), in the left-hand side panels
have signiﬁcantly negative values for most of the hypothetical values of the return on assets
and ﬁrm working capital ratio. This ﬁnding indicates not only that low-capitalized banks
were more likely to increase loans to unviable ﬁrms than were non-low-capitalized banks in
the study period, as suggested by Peek and Rosengren (2005), but also that low-capitalized
banks were more likely to decrease loans to viable ﬁrms than non-low-capitalized banks were
(or leave them unchanged). Rather, given that most ﬁrms borrowing capital performed well
in the late 1990s, the negative values of the interaction eﬀects imply that the misallocation
of credit from viable ﬁrms to unviable ones prevailed because of low-capitalized banks’
motivation to pursue balance sheet cosmetics.
More importantly, the right-hand side panels in Figure 1 show that the marginal eﬀects
for low- and non-low-capitalized banks, AME(REQ2j,t−1 = 1, x2 = x˙2) and AME(REQ2j,t−1 =
0, x2 = x˙2), have signiﬁcantly negative estimates.
9 This ﬁnding clearly indicates that the
misallocation of bank credit from viable ﬁrms to unviable ones prevailed in the Japanese
banking sector in the late 1990s; in other words, Japanese banks provided more credit to
9 Although we deﬁned the low-capitalized bank indicator, REQ2j,t−1, by setting the threshold value of
bank capital buﬀers above the minimum requirement to various values less than two percentage points, we
conﬁrm that the average marginal eﬀects for both low- and non-low-capitalized banks have signiﬁcantly
negative estimates.
9
relatively unviable ﬁrms, while decreasing credit to viable ones (or keeping it unchanged)
regardless of the degree of bank capitalization. This lending behavior by capitalized banks
is not consistent with the balance sheet cosmetics hypothesis.
4. Conclusions The mechanism of unnatural selection suggested by Peek and Rosen-
gren (2005) assumes that forbearance lending by low-capitalized banks to low-quality bor-
rowers prevailed during the late 1990s in Japan, particularly driven by banks’ motivation
to pursue balance sheet cosmetics. In this study, we reevaluated this mechanism by focus-
ing on the interaction eﬀect instead of the coeﬃcient parameter of the interaction term.
More concretely, we discussed a potential shortcoming of specifying bank lending by using
nonlinear functions, demonstrating that their estimation results, which are based on the
random eﬀects probit model, imply that Japanese banks allocated lending from viable ﬁrms
to unviable ones in the late 1990s regardless of the degree of bank capitalization, although
low-capitalized banks were still more likely to do so than non-low-capitalized banks.
Our ﬁnding does not counter the ﬁnding of Peek and Rosengren (2005) in that we
rigorously show that the bank’s balance sheet cosmetics hold for forbearance lending by
low-capitalized banks; rather, we complement it in that we also rigorously demonstrate
that the misallocation of bank credit from viable ﬁrms to unviable ones prevailed in the
Japanese banking system in the late 1990s. Other hypotheses to explain why Japanese
banks emphasized relationships with relatively low-quality ﬁrms were explored by Ogura
et al. (2017) and Nakashima and Takahashi (2018).10
10 Ogura et al. (2017) theoretically and empirically demonstrated that Japanese banks kept lending to
10
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Table 1: Estimated Coecients of the Bank Financial Health Variable,
Firm Performance Variable, and Their Interaction Term
(1994 { 1999)
Estimated Coecients
Descriptive Statistics
(Standard Errors)
Our Estimation Peek and Rosengren
Mean
Min. Max.
(Std. Dev.)
REQ2 0.0556** 0.0582** 0.714 0 1
(0.0164) (0.0157) (0.452)
FROA -0.0086* -0.0075** 2.970 -27.291 26.193
(0.0040) (0.0028) (3.292)
FWORKCAP -0.0107** -0.0097** 10.283 -133.592 89.354
(0.0010) (0.0006) (17.431)
REQ2  FROA -0.0088* -0.0095*
(0.0039) (0.0034)
REQ2  FWORKCAP -0.0029** -0.0030**
(0.0007) (0.0006)
Number of Observations 95566
Number of Firms 1215
Notes: The estimation results are obtained from the random eects probit regression. The
regression also includes all the other control variables of the full sample model reported in
Table 5 of Peek and Rosengren (2005). Peek and Rosengren's (2005) results are obtained from
their Table 5. For the estimation results, standard errors are in parentheses. * Signicant at
the 5 percent level; ** signicant at the 1 percent level.
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Figure 1: Average Interaction Eects and Average Marginal Eects
Notes: The dots (left axis) indicate the estimated average eects and the capped spikes indicate their
95% condence intervals. The shaded areas (right axis) report a histogram of the rm performance
variable.
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